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Abstract
The issue of organ donation and of how the donor pool can or should be increased is one with
significant practical, ethical and logistic implications. Here we comment on an article advocating a
paradigm change in the so-called "dead donor rule". Such change would involve the societal and
legal abandonment of the above rule and the introduction of mandated choice. In this commentary,
we review some of the problems associated with the proposed changes as well as the problems
associated with the current model. We emphasize the continuing problems with the definition of
death and the physiological process of dying; we discuss the difficulties associated with a
dichotomous view of death; we review the difficulties with non-beating heart donation and
emphasize the current limitations of society's understanding of these complex issues. We conclude
that public education remains the best approach and that such education should not be merely
promotion of a particular ideology but honest debate of what is socially and morally acceptable and
appropriate given the changes in vital organ support technology and the need to respect patient
autonomy.
Background
In the last 40 years, transplantation has become an effec-
tive therapy for end-stage organ failure. The vast majority
of viable organs are retrieved from patients who, accord-
ing to the dead donor rule, are considered to be dead
because of irreversible cessation of either cardiac and res-
piratory function or all brain function [1]. Unfortunately,
the definition of the vital status of organ donors has been
challenged both for donation after cardiac death (DCD)
[2-4] and for brain death (BD) [5-7]
As for DCD, Verheijde and colleagues now propose a "par-
adigm change to ensure the legitimacy of DCD practice",
which should include societal and legal abandonment of
the dead donor rule and mandated choice in order to pro-
mote individual participation and to specify personal
decision about organ donation [8]. This approach
requires careful consideration and discussion.
Discussion
The proposal of abandonment of the dead donor rule, "a
switch in the ethics of organ procurement from donor
beneficence to autonomy and non maleficence", is not
new. As for BD, Truog proposed redefining the condition
permitting the retrieval of vital organs in terminal but still
living persons: "This alternative [ethical framework] is
based not on brain death and the dead-donor rule, but on
the ethical principles of non-maleficence (the duty not to
harm, or primum non nocere) and respect for persons. We
propose that individuals who desire to donate their
organs and who are either neurologically devastated or
imminently dying should be allowed to donate their
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organs, without first being declared dead. Advantages of
this approach are that (unlike the dead-donor rule) it
focuses on the most salient ethical issues at stake, and
(unlike the concept of brain death) it avoids conceptual
confusion and inconsistencies" [7].
We believe that the societal acceptability of such position
remains questionable.
The main problem is that this position is still based on the
strict dichotomy between life and death, according to
which, if a patient is not "surely dead", then she/he must
necessarily be still alive. In this case, the process of organ
retrieval is per se the cause of death [9]. But will it ever be
possible to consider socially acceptable and legally per-
missible to "kill" someone, even with her/his own permis-
sion, to retrieve vital organs? We do not think so.
The quite universal opposition to euthanasia and legally
assisted suicide (the developed countries in which they
are not punished as crimes can be counted on the fingers
of one hand) shows very clearly how much opposition
this approach would meet.
An alternative approach is to abandon the above-men-
tioned dichotomy and recognise the necessity to make
prudent decisions in situations where the border between
life and death is presently unknown. Modern technology
has already intruded into the process of dying and has
changed it dramatically. The traditional concepts of life
and death are totally inadequate to describe the new situ-
ations created by intensive care medicine.
As for DCD, irreversible asystole (defined as sufficiently
prolonged absence of cardiac contraction in DNR
patients) appears to be a point of no return in the process
of dying. Yet, as we already wrote [4], the patient's vital
condition in such situation is quite out of our traditional
concept of life and death. As minutes pass, more and more
cells die, but still the "moment of death" remains
unknown. Most probably, such a moment is simply
impossible to determine as an absolute value, because dif-
ferent organs (and, most likely, different patients) "die" at
different times after cardiac arrest. Declaring death at a
moment, which is consistent with the retrieval of viable
organs is much more a moral than a clinical decision [10].
On the other hand, the equivalence of BD and death rests
upon the theory of the "brain as the central integrator of
the body". According to this theory, once the brain is dead
the organism becomes a rapidly desegregating collection
of organs. Such loss of integration shows the biological
death of the patient. "A patient on a ventilator with a
totally destroyed brain is merely a group of artificially
maintained subsystems since the organism as a whole has
ceased to function" [11].
Actually, in BD the cortical and brainstem functions upon
which the diagnosis of BD is made have never been shown
to be recoverable (even after months or years). Yet, some
residual intracranial functions can be retained [12-14].
More important, the overall integration of the organism
may be not completely over. It can be sufficiently pre-
served for prolonged, integrated biological maintenance –
at least in some cases [5,6,15-17].
What is the value of this residual biological integration? Is
it life? Is it a mere biological fact, quite compatible with
the concept of death? We do not know. We believe that
nobody will ever really know. As things are now, it is not
a matter of science. It is a matter of values.
Actually, we do not know what life and death are, in these
extreme situations created by hyper-technological medi-
cine. So, we cannot surely identify a border between them.
And a definition (even though largely – but not univer-
sally – accepted) cannot be a substitute for knowledge
[18]. Our opinion is that the wisest thing to do is to sus-
pend our judgement, until we (society as a whole: clini-
cians, philosophers, bioethicists, lawyers, patients, lay
people) are really able to better understand these situa-
tions. In other words, we should clearly separate the clin-
ical data (the irreversible asystole and the loss of cortical
and brainstem functions) from the social, moral and legal
fact (the death of the patient). Then – as decisions have to
be made – we should ask ourselves what is the right
behaviour in these situations [18] where (again) we are
not able to define the patient's vital status with certainty.
Conclusion
In view of the above consideration, we believe that the
best position is the one expressed in 1988 by the Danish
Council of Ethics [19] regarding BD. After adequate com-
munity involvement, the final decision was that the tradi-
tional cardio-respiratory criterion best fits the widely
socially accepted concept of human death. Yet, at the
same time, the particular significance of brain death ("a
condition ... which absolutely excludes the possibility of
stopping the death process") was recognised: every sup-
port should be forgone, or only maintained to permit
organs retrieval: "such an intervention is cause for the con-
clusion of the process of death, but is not the cause of
death". If we change irreversible asystole with brain death,
the whole paradigm is complete.
Thus, we can't say when someone is "dead". We could,
however, say that irreversible asystole and irreversible
apnoeic coma (brain death in current parlance) are clini-
cally and scientifically useful points of no return, whichPublish with BioMed Central    and   every 
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can be used to guide moral and social decisions and legal
norms. The condition they identify is neither life not
death; it is something in between, a state artificially cre-
ated by high technology medicine. However, they carry
physiological currency, social acceptance and historical
weight. The condition they identify can be considered a
sufficiently advanced step in the process of dying so that
organ retrieval can be allowed in consenting patients
Here we come to second part of the author's proposal, as
knowing the patient's position regarding organ donation
is an indispensable step in the process. An exhaustive dis-
cussion about mandated choice is supplied by the same
authors, which discuss the related bioethical issues (man-
dated choice could be considered as coercive and intrusive
on privacy, and it could disallow consideration of the
family's views). Above all, they illustrate the practical pos-
sible consequence that a majority of people could opt out,
if forced to choose. Although the argument that the rules
should be changed is legitimate, we do not support it. We
think we need to do a lot more education about organ
donation, its value to society and its ethical merit before
we even think about changing the rules. We think that try-
ing to change the rules may decrease organ donation rates
as the public recoils at the renewed gerrymandering of
death by doctors for things to fit into their view of what is
right.
But what does public education really mean? Full disclo-
sure of all relevant issues at stake and open discussion of
all the related implications, or just promotion of donation
cards? As the authors admit, "OPOs [organ procurement
organisations] today have focused their efforts on con-
vincing members of the public to become organ donors
rather than on providing adequate unbiased information
and education about organ donation".
We should not confuse genuine education and improving
awareness and attention to public health issues with
manipulation of people's ideas and opinions. We need to
educate people to what is happening now. Anyone who
has had to speak (as we regularly do) to families who have
just lost a 20 year-old son and then had to get them to
grasp the idea of organ donation and the concepts that
surround it, knows that the community is a million miles
away from the concept of "changing the rules".
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